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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
BANKRUPTCY-Bank Paying Depositor's Check Mter 
His Adjudication in Bankruptcy Is Liable to 
Trustee for Amount of Check-Bank of 
Marin v. England* 
Prior to filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, which is an 
automatic adjudication of bankruptcy,1 depositor delivered five 
checks to Eureka Fisheries drawn upon depositor's account in appel-
lant Bank of Marin. Six days after the filing, Eureka Fisheries pre-
sented the checks to appellant and received payment. Appellee, 
depositor's trustee in bankruptcy, did not notify appellant of the 
bankruptcy proceedings until after appellant had honored the checks. 
An order was sought by appellee from the referee in bankruptcy 
requiring appellant, or in the alternative Eureka Fisheries, to return 
the amount of the honored checks to the bankrupt's estate. The 
referee issued the requested order, and his ruling that appellant 
and Eureka Fisheries were jointly liable was affirmed by the bank-
ruptcy court. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed. After 
an adjudication in bankruptcy, a bank has no authorization to pay 
any checks drawn by a bankrupt depositor, since, upon adjudica-
tion, all of the bankrupt's property vests by operation of law in the 
trustee;2 when checks are honored after adjudication, a bank is 
liable to restore the sum paid out of the bankrupt's account even 
if the bank did not receive notice of the adjudication.3 
• 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 906 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
principal case]. 
I. "The filing of a voluntary petition under chapters I to 7 of this title, other 
than a petition filed in behalf of a partnership by less than all of the partners, shall 
operate as an adjudication with the same force and effect as a decree of adjudication." 
Bankruptcy Act § 18(£), as amended, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), II U.S.C. § 41(£) (1964). 
" 'Adjudication' shall mean a determination, whether by decree or by operation of 
law, that a person is bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act § 1(2), as amended, 73 Stat. 109 
(1959), II U.S.C. § 1(2) (1964). 
The provision that filing is an automatic adjudication is not a significant change 
in the law. Previously it was necessary for a judge to make a formal order of ad-
judication but as a practical matter this generally followed automatically upon the 
filing. E.g., In re Howe, 235 Fed. 908, 909 (D. Mass 1916), afj'd sub nom. Edison Elec-
tric Illuminating Co. v. Tibbetts, 241 Fed. 468 (1st Cir. 1917) (per curiam). The amend-
ment eliminated the administrative burden involved in requiring an adjudication by 
a judge. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1J 18.01[3.6] (14th ed. 1964); s. REP. No. 320, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). 
2. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt •.. shall .•. be vested by operation 
of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition 
initiating a proceeding under this title . • . to all of the following kinds of prop-
erty wherever located . • . . (5) property, including rights of action, which prior 
to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which 
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or other-
wise seized, impounded, or sequestered. 
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, II U.S.C. § IIO(a) 
(1964). • 
3. Although in the principal case the bank was held jointly liable with Eureka 
Fisheries, Eureka paid the entire claim to the trustee and filed a claim for contribu-
tion against the bank. The rights between these parties had not been determined at 
the time of the decision in the principal case. Principal case at 188, 193 n.12. 
[ 195] 
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Aside from the principal case, the only other reported case 
dealing with the liability under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 of 
a bank which honored checks of a depositor after adjudication 
is Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,4 in which the court 
held that "a bank is not liable when in good faith and without 
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy it honors the bankrupt's check 
in the regular course of its business . . . ."5 The Rosenthal court 
relied on a proviso to section 70(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act which 
stated: "That nothing in this title shall impair the negotiability of 
currency or negotiable instruments."6 The court said that one of the 
purposes of this previously uninterpreted provision was to protect 
banks in post-adjudication transactions.7 The basis for this inter-
pretation of legislative intent, however, was not indicated; in fact, 
the finding was made in spite of the section's introductory language 
which indicates that it applies only to transactions after bankruptcy 
but before adjudication.8 The court in the principal case rejected 
the Rosenthal interpretation; reliance on the "negotiability" clause 
was deemed unwarranted in light of this introductory language, 
and because the presentation of a check by a payee for payment by 
a drawee bank is not considered a negotiation. 9 
In addition to its attempted use of the Rosenthal decision as con-
trolling authority, appellant bank suggested that the trustee should 
be barred from recovery on a theory of !aches or estoppel because of 
his failure to give appellant notice of depositor's bankruptcy before 
the checks were honored. The Bankruptcy Act places a duty on the 
trustee to gather the property of the bankrupt "as expeditiously as 
is compatible with the best interests of the parties in interest."10 The 
trustee has been held liable for losses incurred by the estate through 
his negligence11 and he has been denied recovery of interest on 
funds which he had advanced to pay expenses when he had improp-
4. 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956). 
5. Id. at 736. (Emphasis added.) 
6. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(5), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) 
(1964): "Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision and in subdivision g of sec-
tion 44 of this title, no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of 
bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee: Provided, however, That nothing in this 
title shall impair the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments." 
7. Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 730, 736 (W.D. La. 1956). 
8. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(d) (1964): 
"After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver takes possession 
of the property of the bankrupt . . . ." 
9. Principal case at 189. It should further be noted that the following cases, cited 
in Rosenthal for the proposition that a bank paying checks in good faith without 
knowledge of pending bankruptcy proceedings, were all cases involving a payment 
by a bank before adjudication. Citizens Union Nat'! Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527, 
31 A.L.R. 256 (6th Cir. 1923); Stevens v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 
409 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Cunningham v. Lexington Trust Co., 259 Mass. 181, 156 N.E. 
1, 54 A.L.R. 751 (1927). 
10. Bankruptcy Act § 47(a)(l), 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 75(a)(l) (1964). 
11. In re India Wharf Brewery, Inc., 96 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1938). 
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erly delayed in administering the estate.12 However, no case can be 
found in which the trustee was precluded from recovering property 
belonging to the estate of the bankrupt on a theory of estoppel or 
!aches because of either the trustee's delay in securing the property 
or his failure to give timely notice to interested parties of the ad-
judication.13 The assumption that such a defense would be available 
would seemingly run counter to the provisions of section 70(d) 
which specifically mention those transactions which are safe from 
the trustee's attack.14 
The statutory protection of certain transactions taking place 
after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy was necessitated by the 
inconsistent judicial interpretations of the language of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.15 In its original form the Act provided that "the 
trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall ... be vested by opera-
tion of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was 
adjudged a bankrupt."16 In their desire to prevent depletion of the 
bankrupt's estate before the adjudication, courts expanded the scope 
12. Brown v. Leo, 34 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1929). 
13. If such a defense is available to appellant, the question still remains as to 
whether appellee's failure in the principal case to notify appellant within six days 
of the filing of the petition is such an unreasonable delay as to bar recovery. The 
court in the principal case did not deal with this question. It should also be pointed 
out that a trustee in bankruptcy could never give notice prior to an adjudication 
since he is not appointed until the first meeting of the creditors after the adjudica-
tion. Bankruptcy Act § 44(a), 52 Stat. 860 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72(a) (1964). 
14. Principal case at 191. Other defenses proved equally unavailing to the appel-
lant. A claim that it was protected by a California statute allowing a bank to cash 
checks in disregard of adverse claims to bank deposits until a court order was issued 
prohibiting such payment was held inapplicable since the claim of the trustee in 
bankruptcy is not an adverse claim within the meaning of the statute. Appellant's 
other arguments, that it was deprived of property without due process of law since it 
had not received notice of the bankruptcy proceedings and that it was required to 
make a double pa}ment of a debt, were also rejected. Id. at 192-93. These constitu-
tional arguments have not been directly considered by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of a situation such as the one presented in the principal case, and the decisions 
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and Hanover 
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), cited by appellant in support of his argu-
ments are distinguishable. Moyses dealt with the right of a creditor to reasonable 
notice of bankruptcy proceedings while Mullane considered the rights of trust bene-
ficiaries to notice of proceedings dealing with the trustee's settlement of accounts. In 
both of these proceedings the parties held to be entitled to notice had rights and 
interests in the funds which were the subject of the proceedings and were entitled 
to their day in court to assert and protect those rights and interests. In the principal 
case, the bank was merely a debtor of the bankrupt and as such had no comparable 
interest. The principal case would thus seem to fall clearly within the rule of Mueller 
v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I (1902), that title to a bankrupt's property vests in the bank-
ruptcy trustee and is under the control of the bankruptcy court. The Mueller court 
did not concern itself as to whether notice to a bankrupt's debtors was necessary. 
15. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 394, 398, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 
U.S. 917 (1955); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1J 70.66; WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY 
LAw OF 1938 161 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1937); Hearings 
on Revision of the Bankruptcy Act Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 211-12 (1937). 
16 • .Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898). 
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of the provision and held that the trustee's title, though vesting 
upon adjudication, related back so as to embrace all of the property 
the bankrupt had at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.17 
The filing of the petition was deemed "a caveat to all the world, 
and in effect an attachment and injunction."18 If this interpreta-
tion were carried to its logical extreme, all transfers of a bankrupt's 
property subsequent to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy would 
have to be invalidated. Obviously this would produce harsh results 
where a party dealt with the bankrupt in good faith and without 
knowledge of the filing. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult 
for a party against whom a petition has been filed to conduct even 
those business operations which would not deplete the estate since 
others would be reluctant to deal with him in light of the potential 
invalidity of all property transfers. The courts recognized these in-
equities, and, in an attempt to protect bona fide transactions taking 
place between filing and adjudication, began to retreat from the 
unwavering use of the filing date as the cut-off point.19 
The courts, however, failed to establish a clear pattern of excep-
tions and the resulting uncertainty led to the passage of the Chand-
ler Act in 1938, in which Congress (I) amended the Bankruptcy Act 
to provide that title to the estate of a bankrupt vests in the trustee 
on the date on which the petition in bankruptcy is filed,20 and (2) 
specifically enumerated the transactions between filing and adjudi-
cation which were to be protected.21 Section 70(d) excepted trans-
actions occurring "after bankruptcy and either before adjudication 
or before a receiver takes possession of the property of the bank-
rupt" when a bankrupt's property is transferred in good faith for a 
"present fair equivalent value."22 Also, protected were persons who, 
being indebted to or holding property of the bankrupt, pay such 
indebtedness or deliver such property in good faith to the bankrupt 
or to his order.23 The only provision explicitly exempting trans-
actions occurring after adjudication is found in section 2l(g) which 
deals with transfers of real property.24 Finally, section 70(d) pro-
17. Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1913); Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman 
Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 307 (1911); State Bank v. Cox, 143 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1906); 
4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1f 70.66; MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 169 (1956). 
18. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I, 14 (1902). 
19. Cunningham v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925); Citizens Union 
Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir. 1923); In re Zotti, 186 Fed. 84 (2d Cir. 
1911); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 11 70.66; McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bank• 
ruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REv. 583, 612-16 (1927). 
20. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 
§ ll0(a) (1964). See text of Act at note 2 supra. 
21. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(d) (1964). 
22. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(l), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(d)(l) 
(1964). 
23. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(2), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(2) 
(1964). 
24. Bankruptcy Act § 2l(g), added by 52 Stat. 853 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964). 
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vides that only those transactions specifically excepted therein or 
mentioned in section 2I(g) would be valid as against the trustee.25 
Both before and after the enactment of section 70(d), courts have 
held that a party can be required to return to the trustee property of 
a bankrupt received after adjudication.26 The banks in the principal 
case and Rosenthal did not receive property of the bankrupt, but 
section 70(d) has been interpreted as placing an absolute ban on all 
transfers of a bankrupt's property after adjudication, except as spe-
cifically exempted.27 Such an interpretation would seem to support 
the view taken in the principal case that, although a party has not 
received property of the bankrupt, if his actions, albeit in good 
faith, have resulted in the improper removal of property from the 
bankrupt's estate, he may be liable to the trustee to the extent of the 
depletion. 
If the property is distributed subsequent to removal, the party 
responsible for the depletion in the bankrupt's estate may be forced 
to use his own property to replace the removed property even 
though it is unlikely that he will obtain reimbursement from the 
bankrupt party or the party to whom the property was distributed. 
Such a situation occurred in the principal case and the analogous case 
of Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co.28 In Lake, five insurers, without 
knowledge of the prior filing of a bankruptcy petition and in re-
liance on the bankrupt's claim of title to life insurance policies, lent 
the bankrupt approximately $45,000 on the policies, taking assign-
ments of the policies as security.29 When the trustee in bankruptcy 
discovered the policies and the loans, he gave the bankrupt an op-
portunity to exercise his right to retain the policies by paying into 
the estate their cash surrender values.30 When the bankrupt refused 
25. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(5), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) 
(1964). This clause ends with the proviso that the negotiability of currency or nego-
tiable instruments is not to be impaired. 
26. Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1961); In re Howe, 235 
Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916), aff'd sub nom. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Tibbetts, 
241 Fed. 468 (1st Cir. 1917) (per curiam). 
27. Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1961); 
Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1959); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 
F.2d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1955); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1111 70.67-.68. One early 
case under Pennsylvania bankruptcy law held, on facts similar to those in the prin-
cipal case, a bank liable for payment of a check after the depositor was adjudged 
bankrupt. Wickersham v. Nicholson, 14 Serg. & R. ll8 (Pa. 1826). Pre-Chandler Act 
cases give no indication that any transactions occurring subsequent to adjudication 
would be protected. In re Howe, 235 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916), aff'd sub nom. Edison 
Electric Illuminating Co. v. Tibbetts, 241 Fed. 468 (1st Cir. 1917) (per curiam). See 
Citizens Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir. 1923); In re Zotti, 186 
Fed. 84 (2d Cir. 1911); Stevens v . .Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 409 
(S.D.N.Y. 1931). 
28. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1955). 
29. The bankrupt in fact had misrepresented to the insurer that no bankruptcy 
proceedings were outstanding against him. 
30. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) 
(1964). 
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to exercise this right, the trustee sued the insurers for the cash 
surrender value of the policies, an amount slightly in excess of the 
amount of the loans. The policies remained physically in the 
possession of the bankrupt, but the court found that the receiver 
had taken actual possession of the bankrupt's property before the 
loan was made, and that the insurers could not rely on section 
70(d) to protect their receipt of the assignment of the policies. 
Although it recognized the plight of the insurers, the court held that 
the statute invalidated all transfers of property not granted specific. 
protection, and ordered the insurers to pay the cash surrender values 
of the policies to the trustee. Thus, the insurers were forced to pay 
both the loans and the cash surrender values-approximately twice 
_the value of the policy-without any assurance that they would be 
able to recover the loan from the bankrupt.31 The court did not feel 
it was competent to answer the question of whether the limited 
protection set out by Congress was the best solution to the problem 
of the validity of transactions affecting a bankrupt's property after 
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.32 In Lake, as in the principal 
case, the court felt bound by the statutory limits prescribed by 
Congress. 83 
The court in Rosenthal avoided the above result by placing the 
bank under the protection of the proviso against the impairment of 
the negotiability of negotiable instruments.34 This approach, which 
was rejected in the principal case,35 was criticized by commentators 
since the payment of a check by a drawee bank is not a negotiation, 
and thus to hold a bank liable for cashing checks of a depositor 
31. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1955). The debt 
of the bankrupt to the insurer for the loan was presumably not affected by a dis-
charge of the bankrupt policy holder as the loan was obtained by false representa-
tions. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(2), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) 
(1964). Of course, the survival of a right of action after bankruptcy carries no as-
surances of a recovery. 
32. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 31, at 399. 
33. In 1955 following the decision in Lake the insurance industry attempted to 
have Congress change the Bankruptcy Act so as to protect insurance companies which 
made payments on policies after adjudication when they had no knowledge of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. S. 1998, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) would have amended 
§ 70(a)(5) by adding the following to the end of the clause: 
And provided further, That when any insurance company, either before or after 
the adjudication of bankruptcy, in good faith and without actual knowledge of 
bankruptcy, makes any payment pursuant to the provisions of a life insurance 
policy or contract, such payment shall have the same effect so far as such com-
pany is concerned as if the bankruptcy were not pending. 
S. 1999, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) would have amended § 70(d)(5) to provide that 
a good faith payment on a policy by an insurer without actual knowledge of the 
bankruptcy would be a valid transfer as against the trustee. The National Bank-
ruptcy Conference adopted a resolution opposing the proposed amendments. Resolu-
tion No. 28, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, 1956 
MEETING, at 12. The amendments were never enacted by the Congress. 
34. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text. 
35. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
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after his adjudication is not to impair the negotiability of the 
check.30 It has been suggested that the "negotiability" clause was 
included to avoid any implication that the restrictions in the Bank-
ruptcy Act modified the law of negotiable instruments37 and to 
protect the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment.38 As a drawee bank is not a holder in due course, it would 
not be within the intended scope of protection.39 Therefore, the 
Rosenthal interpretation affords banks a special protection which 
neither the express language of the statute nor its legislative history 
indicates they were intended to have.40 
Not only does the Rosenthal interpretation lack statutory sup-
port, but it might, in fact, have broader implications than was 
realized by the court which expounded it. If the interpretation 
which protects the bank in the present situation were accepted, 
there would not be any valid reason for not applying the same 
rationale to a situation in which a debt owing to the bankrupt was 
paid after the adjudication of bankruptcy but was not paid to the 
bankrupt's estate. The employer who pays wages earned prior to 
bankruptcy after an adjudication would seemingly be entitled to 
the same protection that the bank receives under Rosenthal. Indeed, 
the employer would probably have less reason to know of or suspect 
bankruptcy proceedings than a bank that surveys legal publications 
which announce such proceedings. However, the language of the 
Bankruptcy Act does not protect such transactions. 
Courts have said that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a 
caveat to the whole world, and that all property of the bankrupt is 
thereafter in custodia legis-beyond the power of the bankrupt to 
transfer.41 Therefore, once a petition is filed, the bank's obligation 
to pay the bankrupt's check would be extinguished, for the funds in 
the bank would be the trustee's funds rather than the bankrupt's.42 
36. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, at 1502 n.3; Seligson, Creditors Rights, 32 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 708, 730-31 (1957). Payment of a check by a drawee bank is not a 
negotiation. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Marion Nat'l Bank, 116 Ind. App. 453, 64 
N.E.2d 583, 589 (1946); BRITTON, B1u.s & NoTES 118 (2d ed. 1961). 
37. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1502. 
38. Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 548, 550 (1957); Note, 64 HARV, L. REv. 958, 965 (1951). 
39. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. General Finance Corp., 297 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 
1961). 
40. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1502 n.3. 
41. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 4 (1902); Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 
654, 656 (10th Cir. 1961); Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658, 660 
(2d Cir. 1940); In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D. N.J. 1955). 
That the bank was not a party to the adjudication proceedings made no difference 
as the adjudication in bankruptcy is a proceeding in rem and binds all parties in 
interest whether or not they appear at the proceedings. Myers v. International Trust 
Co., 263 U.S. 64, 73 (1923); Gratiot County State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246, 248 
(1919); 2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1[ 18.43. 
42. Harrison State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Neb. 456, 218 N.W. 92 (1928); 
Guthrie Nat'! Bank v. Gill, 6 Okla. 560, 54 Pac. 434 (1898); BRADY, BANK CHECKS 25 
(3d ed. 1962); The Law of Bank Check-General Principles, 78 BANKING L.J. 277, 301 
(1961); see NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 329 (1948). 
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The bank may argue that this imposes an undue burden, since it is 
not commercially feasible to verify the financial standing of the 
drawer of every check as each check is presented for payment. The 
difficulty is compounded by the fact that a bankruptcy petition filed 
anywhere in the United States has the same effect in all courts as it 
has in the court in which it is filed.43 As compared with the bank's 
burden, the burden which would be placed on a trustee by requir-
ing him to give notice to the bank of pending bankruptcies appears 
relatively insignificant. The disparity of these burdens, however, 
did not persuade the court in the principal case, because the court 
thought that various legal publications and modern communications 
allow a bank to keep abreast of bankruptcy proceedings without 
great inconvenience. Furthermore, the danger of bankruptcies is 
merely another risk of doing business and whatever cost might be 
involved can be passed on to the customers. In any event, even if the 
bank has difficulties in keeping abreast of bankruptcy petitions, the 
infrequency ·with which this problem arises, as is evidenced by the 
fact that the principal case and Rosenthal are the only reported 
cases in which the question arose, seems to indicate that the banks 
are not terribly threatened by the imposition of this liability.44 
Consideration must also be given to the process of administering 
a bankrupt's estate and the objectives sought to be achieved in such 
a proceeding. In order to prevent depletion of the bankrupt's estate 
and to distribute the bankrupt's assets equitably among his credi-
tors, the Bankruptcy Act places full control over the estate in the 
court at a particular point in time.45 With few exceptions, the point 
in time is the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.46 If a court were 
to extend protection to transactions other than those specifically 
excepted by the statute, it would subject the bankrupt's estate to 
further depletion and prevent the trustee from gaining effective 
control of the estate until he had given specific notice, not required 
by the statute, to those parties who are likely to deal with the bank-
rupt's property.47 Since the trustee is not appointed until after the 
adjudication of bankruptcy, such notice could never be given before 
adjudication,48 and the Congressional mandate as to the point of 
time for the vesting of property in the trustee would be frustrated 
to the detriment of the creditors. A bank, such as the one in the 
principal case, may have been acting in good faith, but when a 
43. Principal case at 190. 
44. Id. at 190-91. 
45. Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 307 (1911); In Te 
Ostlind Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Ore. 1937); In Te Jones, 10 F. Supp. 165, 
167 (W.D. Mo. 1935); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, 1) 70.66; MACLACHLAN, op. cit. 
supra note 17, at 346. 
46. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
47. See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 548 (1957). 
48. See note 13 supra. 
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choice must be made between the bank and the creditors in deter­
mining who should bear the loss from the bank's mistaken payment, 
both the existing law and policy indicate that a creditor who is not 
in a position to prevent the payment should be protected. 
